Issue link: https://mbozikis.ufcontent.com/i/1422521
90 possession's general authorization to use, sell, or lease property (11 U.S.C. § 363), or when existing lien-holders would be negatively affected by postpetition credit secured by a senior or equal lien on the existing creditor's collateral (11 U.S.C. § 364(d)). Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define the concept of adequate protection, it does provide a non-exhaustive list of actions that may constitute adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 361. A debtor may provide adequate protection by (i) making single or periodic cash payments to the creditor whose interest will be affected, (ii) granting the creditor an additional or replacement lien, or (iii) granting the creditor the "indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the property. Id. An additional or replacement lien is particularly appropriate in a situation where, in order to continue the debtor's business, the trustee proposes to use or dispose of property subject to a creditor's floating lien. In such a case, an alternative lien in inventory or accounts receivable may be designed to provide adequate protection. The third alternative, the so-called "indubitable equivalent" requirement, is a catch-all derived from Judge Learned Hand's decision in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935), and was initially used to mean "complete compensation." Under this Section, which applies when cash payments or replacement liens are not feasible, parties are given great flexibility in fashioning appropriate protection with the sole requirement being the provision of "indubitable equivalent" value. In the case of an oversecured creditor, adequate protection may be provided by an "equity cushion." An "equity cushion" is the excess value of the collateral over the amount of the debt. An equity cushion is generally considered to provide adequate protection as long as it is of sufficient size, but the trustee or debtor-in-possession may not erode it entirely. It is important to note that undersecured creditors cannot argue that their claim to postpetition interest or other payments in